Poland’s deputy prime minister Marek Pol and his Russian counterpart Viktor Khristenko jointly announced the successful completion of the talks in late February. “We managed to remove one of the greatest problems in Polish/Russian relations,” said Pol after signing an addendum to the gas contract. Poland consumes about 10Bcum of gas annually, roughly as much as the much-smaller and less-densely-populated Slovakia, and many times less than Hungary and other EU countries. One of the main reasons for this is Poland’s small gas market, while another problem, inherited from the former Soviet bloc, is the existing gas pipeline network and specific relations between the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, and Central and Eastern European countries. Russia accounts for about 60% of natural gas consumed in Poland, Germany and Norway provide a combined 5% of imports, while the remaining demand is satisfied from locally-produced gas from the SE of the country. Gazprom, therefore, practically monopolizes Poland’s natural gas imports. The existing pipeline network rules out any major changes in this arrangement. Most of the gas can only flow to Poland through the Yamal gas pipeline, which leads from Siberia to the former East Germany, and the exclusive exporter of Russian gas is Gazprom through its subsidiary Gazexport. The Polish state importer, Polish Oil and Gas exctarction Co (PGNiG), signed the so-called ‘contract of the century’ with Gazprom in the mid-1990s; under this contract, by 2020, PGNiG was to buy 250Bcum of gas. When announced, it was hailed as a major success for Poland, as it guaranteed continued deliveries for two decades. However, it turned out that PGNiG had overestimated the demand. If all of the contracted gas was to be consumed, annual consumption in Poland would have to rise to more than 15Bcum over a few years, more than 50% while, in reality, it will probably remain at a level of around 10Bcum. The contract, meanwhile, includes a ‘take or pay’ clause. Under the addendum to the Yamal contract, in 2003-20 Poland will import 74Bcum less than originally stipulated; Pol says this means a 26.5% reduction in deliveries considering the entire agreement, and a 34.5% reduction in the period 2003-20 covered by the negotiations. The Warsaw Voice points out that if the problem with the Polish/Russian deal has been more or less successfully solved, whether or not Poland has a chance to buy gas on market terms remains an open question. In the long term, after the Gazprom contract and its addendum expires in 2022, Poland will probably want to buy gas in the free market, and there is no current plan for this. A proposal promoted by the country’s previous government for building an underwater gas pipeline from Norway seems unrealistic; to be profitable, the pipeline would have to carry at least 8Bcum of gas annually, while such huge amounts cannot be sold in either Poland or neighbouring countries. However, EuRoPol Gaz shareholder Aleksander Gudzowaty is reported to advocate building a pipeline from Germany’s Bernau to Szczecin. Connecting the Polish gas network with Norwegian deposits via Germany in this way would be much cheaper than a subsea gas pipeline, particularly as the route on the Polish side of the border would only be 50km long.